I like the ‘Hidden God’ and the ‘Problem of Suffering’ as arguments against God. The arguments are very simple: God should not hide Himself from us as convincingly as He does and leave our salvation to the capricious luck of faith; suffering caused by the whims of natural powers should not exist. But in response to both of these arguments there is a floating sentence fragment: morally sufficient reason. I’m not sure the people who use it are thinking it through.
If I want to do something, and I can do it, but I don’t do it then I don’t really want to or I can’t really do it. For example, if I want to fly and I might convince myself I can. But the truth is I can’t really fly. I might convince myself I want to cause a certain person a serious injury, and I certainly am capable of that. But I haven’t, because I don’t really want to hurt someone. If there is “morally sufficient reason” to stop me doing something (like hurting someone) then I don’t really want to–at least, I do not want to do it as much as I want to realise whatever the “morally sufficient reason” is. But if I were omnipotent, any semblance of exclusivity between the things I want and the morally sufficient reason not to do it can be overcome.
If I want to kill someone but I don’t want to be a murderer then I am simply wrong about what it is I want. It doesn’t mean anything to say I want to kill someone but don’t want to be a murderer. My action comes as a package and if I don’t want it, I don’t want it. And when it comes to killing a person my want to not be a killer considerably outweighs my wish to kill. I simply do not want that package. I don’t really want to kill someone. The balancing act one plays when they weigh up how much they want and do not want each element of a package like this comes across as moral confusion. But the answer does come down one way or the other.
So when an apologist argues that God has morally sufficient reason to allow immense suffering to engulf a community, including the little children, in a barbaric indiscriminate blanket of pain and misery (like a drought leading to starvation, or a mudslide that wipes out a village, or a tsunami that ruins multiple civilisations and leaves millions of families desolate and grieving) those apologists are saying this: the God that loves those people, like He loves you, did not really want to protect them from that. God thinks something nice, and somehow worthwhile, might come from that.
There is a stranger question, though. If God is moral, why would be ever want to do something immoral? And if He never wants to do anything immoral, why does He ever have morally sufficient reason to not do something He wants to do?
It is less complicated and more obvious in the ‘Hidden God’ argument. He wants to save us and has made it so that our salvation rests on belief. He, therefore, wants us to believe. But some of us need evidence to believe. So God wants to give us convincing evidence. Without the evidence some of us won’t believe, and without belief there is no salvation for us, and God wants us to have salvation. Therefore He wants to give us the convincing evidence. If He doesn’t really want to give us evidence, He doesn’t really want us to be saved—and that is not a benevolent God. If your definition of a God is inflexible I just broke it. If it is flexible, can you please explain where this leaves your definition of God? Lacking in benevolence? Lacking in power? Lacking in morals? Lacking?
Omnipotence and desire do lead to attainment. Else you are lacking in one of those departments.