Ontological Arguments for the existence of God are an odd grouping. Not much holds them together except for their most common rebuttal: that they attempt to define a God into existence. This is not my favourite rebuttal to the arguments, although it is true: ontological arguments for God try to sneak the idea of existing… Continue reading Ontological Arguments
Introduction There is an argument for the existence of God called ‘The Modal Ontological Argument for the existence of God’ (MOAG). A major part of MOAG is the idea that something is ‘possible’. The “something” is a ‘maximally great being’, or something similar depending on which version you read. The vagueness of the “something” ―… Continue reading No way!? Is that ‘Possible’?
There is an argument for God called the ‘Ontological argument’ and it received an ambivalent welcome whenever it is trotted out, which seems increasingly rarely. It isn’t at all compelling, and yet that appears to be irrational because it’s rare to see someone actually attack the premises or the structure. However, that, today, is what… Continue reading The Ontological Argument for God – and why it’s nonsense
Argument A: The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God (1) God is a being greater than which none can be conceived (or the Greatest Conceivable Being). (2) The Greatest Conceivable Being does exist in the mind. (3) If the Greatest Conceivable Being were to exist in only the mind, we could conceive of a… Continue reading Of Gods and Unicorns: there must be a mistake with the ontological argument