Peterson has continued to repeat the way in which he finds the ‘Judeochristian story’ to be relevant or useful, even if he hasn’t yet found a way to justify that it is ‘true’. In the general context of this blog, it’s interesting that Peterson hasn’t tasked himself with defending the claim that any religion is… Continue reading Maps of Meaning, discussion – Part 5a, Culture and Cultural Personality
Since my last update, I have come across two things in Maps of Meaning which seem to fully undermine the whole structure of Peterson’s thesis thus far. These are ‘The Terrible Mother’ and ‘goal-like’ behaviour which is instinctive. But, before we get there, I’m going to recap some main points and give the relevant expansions… Continue reading Maps of Meaning, discussion – Part 3a, Death, Sacrifice and Femininity
There is a claim that forms an integral part of the Teleological Argument for the existence of God, an argument that claims the universe has clear signs of purpose. This claim is that a life-permitting universe is so unbelievably unlikely that no thinking person should be able to say it happened due to chance. The… Continue reading What are the odds against a Life Permitting Universe
It’s a long standing argument: can theism be justified within scientific thinking? There have been attempts to bypass the argument, by calling the two concepts “non-overlapping magisteria”: the claim that the two concepts simply answer different questions and therefore are never justified by each other and never in conflict (Gould, 2011). However, that is not… Continue reading Are theism and science incompatible?
Introduction There is an argument for the existence of God called ‘The Modal Ontological Argument for the existence of God’ (MOAG). A major part of MOAG is the idea that something is ‘possible’. The “something” is a ‘maximally great being’, or something similar depending on which version you read. The vagueness of the “something” ―… Continue reading No way!? Is that ‘Possible’?
The Euthyphro Dilemma is a Theology 101 problem, without a satisfactory answer. Posed in Plato’s dialogues, it is often formulated like this: “Does God command something is good because it is good, or is it good because God commands it”. Plato was writing from a polytheistic culture, so this is a variation (and translation) on… Continue reading Is it good because it is God’s nature? or is it God’s nature because it is good?
There’s a way of thinking called abductive reasoning, commonly referred to as “the inference to the best explanation”. Sherlock Holmes famously uses it, and his use is fallacious. There are many structures of argument that would fall under abductive reasoning, which this post will look at, briefly, focussing on their errors. It will then focus… Continue reading Sherlock Holmes, ‘inference to the best explanation’, false dichotomies and God
There is an argument for God called the ‘Ontological argument’ and it received an ambivalent welcome whenever it is trotted out, which seems increasingly rarely. It isn’t at all compelling, and yet that appears to be irrational because it’s rare to see someone actually attack the premises or the structure. However, that, today, is what… Continue reading The Ontological Argument for God – and why it’s nonsense
Myths ― and the idea of them As I argued a few weeks ago, the material world definitely exists. The material seems concrete to us, and it exists in the most agreeable sense of the word. We are all aware that there is a deeper sense to this, and that the material is simply mind-driven… Continue reading Is it the Best Myth for the Goal?
In previous posts I argued discussions that aim at a representation of reality are a game, bound by rules of rationality and evidence. But, it’s not the only game in town and another one is apologetics ― bound by rules of contrived reason, aiming to look like rationality but aiming in a completely different direction.… Continue reading A Case Study in Apologetics